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INTRODUCTION 
Adult guardianship is the state law process by which a court 
appoints a surrogate to make decisions for an adult who is deemed 
“incapacitated,” frequently by virtue of intellectual disability, mental 
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illness, or cognitive impairment.1  Once an individual is under 
guardianship, she loses her rights to make basic decisions about her 
life, including where she lives, how to spend her money, and whether 
to consent to health care.2  For the last several decades, guardianship 
has been the subject of continual calls for reform, often spurred by 
revelations of guardian malfeasance and other abuses in the system.3 
Recent developments in international human rights law and 
disability rights advocacy, however, pose a more fundamental 
challenge to the institution.  Article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),4 with 
its declaration that everyone, regardless of mental disability or 
cognitive impairment, is entitled to make decisions and have those 
decisions recognized under the law, offers no less than a promise to 
end adult guardianship as we know it.5 
Under Article 12, governments may not deprive individuals of their 
“legal capacity,” or right to make decisions and have those decisions 
recognized, on the grounds of disability or impaired decision-making 
skills.6  Instead, cognitive and other mental disabilities trigger a right 
to “support” in decision-making.7  This support can take the form of 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 102(5) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997) (defining “incapacitated person”). See infra note 26 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of who becomes subject to guardianship. 
 2. See id. §§ 315(a)(2),(4) (guardian may consent to health care, choose place of 
residence) and 410(a)(2) (conservator may make any financial decision person could 
have made).  The UGPPA and a number of states differentiate between a 
“conservator,” who is given power over a person’s financial matters, and a 
“guardian,” who is given power over health care and personal decisions.  For 
purposes of this Article, I will refer to systems in which a surrogate is appointed to 
make financial and/or personal decisions collectively as guardianship. 
 3. See infra notes 48–50, 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 4. G.A. Res. 61/106, art. 12, Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (Dec. 13, 2006). 
 5. Id. 
 6. G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 4, § 2; see also Comm. on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1, art. 12, ¶ 13, 15, U.N. Doc CRPD/C/GC/1 
(Apr. 11, 2014) (hereinafter “CRPD General Comment”) (explaining difference 
between legal capacity and mental capacity and reiterating that Article 12 does not 
permit the deprivation of legal decision-making rights on the grounds that an 
individual’s decision-making skills are impaired).  
Legal capacity is the ability to hold rights and duties (legal standing) and to 
exercise those rights and duties (legal agency). It is the key to accessing 
meaningful participation in society.  Mental capacity refers to the decision-
making skills of a person, which naturally vary from one person to another 
and may be different for a given person depending on many factors, 
including environmental and social factors. 
Id. 
 7. See G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 4, § 3. 
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accessible formats or technological assistance in communication.8  Or 
it can take the form of “supported decision-making” arrangements, in 
which “supporters” assist individuals with decision-making in 
relationships of trust.9  In whatever form, the support is an 
appropriate accommodation that enables the individual to enjoy the 
right to legal capacity.10 
The United States signed, but, somewhat notoriously, has not 
ratified the CRPD.11  Nonetheless, the concept of “supported 
decision-making” has generated significant excitement among 
disability rights advocates.  The federal Department of Health and 
Human Services’ Administration for Community Living, which 
promotes independent living for persons with disabilities and older 
adults, has endorsed the concept and funded a national resource 
center on the topic.12  Pilot projects to provide supported decision-
making services continue to spring up around the country.13 
But as proponents of supported decision-making have made 
significant inroads in persuading the disability rights community that 
guardianships should be supplanted by this more rights-based 
alternative, questions persist about how it could and should work in 
practice.  Nina Kohn and others have pointed to a dearth of empirical 
data on how supported decision-making actually functions to support 
                                                                                                                                         
 8. CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 17. 
 9. Id. ¶ 29 (describing supported decision-making regimes). 
 10. For a full discussion of support as a reasonable accommodation required 
under U.S. law by the Americans with Disabilities Act, see Leslie Salzman, 
Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision-making as a Violation of the 
Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 157 (2010). 
 11. See Rosalind S. Helderman, Senate Rejects Treaty to Protect Disabled 
Around the World, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2012. 
 12. Aaron Bishop & Edwin Walker, Preserving the Right to Self-Determination: 
Supported Decision-Making, ACL BLOG, http://www.acl.gov/NewsRoom/blog/2015/
2015_01_28.aspx [https://perma.cc/6TP8-WXFW]. 
 13. See, e.g., Funding Announcement: Supported Decision-Making, N.Y. STATE 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES PLANNING COUNCIL, http://www.ddpc.ny.gov/sites/
default/files/Supported%20Decision%20Making%20RFP%20Final%20Electronic%20
Version_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KH2-2F9R] (announcing availability of funds to 
launch a supported decision-making pilot project); see also The Arc of San Angelo: 
Volunteer-Supported Decision-Making, TEX. DEP’T OF AGING & DISABILITY SERVS., 
http://www.tcdd.texas.gov/projects/grants-completed-projects/the-arc-of-san-angelo/ 
[http://perma.cc/LT95-BCQ9] (describing pilot project run by the Arc of San Angelo, 
with funding from the Texas Council for Developmental Disabilities); Pilot Project, 
CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, http://supporteddecisions.org/ [https://perma.cc/
L5A3-L5KV] (describing supported decision-making pilot run by Center for Public 
Representation and Nonotuck Resource Associates in Northampton, Massachusetts). 
498 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
the normative and ethical arguments for it.14  Advocates are 
beginning to address those critiques by developing assessment tools 
for emerging pilot projects.15 
Perhaps the most significant hurdle in shifting opinion toward 
supported decision-making is developing an argument for it that 
addresses the particular concerns of a significant, and likely growing, 
segment of those under guardianships: older persons, many of whom 
have cognitive impairments such as dementia.  Older persons are 
believed to comprise a majority of the persons under guardianships16 
but, to date, their particular concerns have not been a central part of 
the legal capacity discussion.  Supported decision-making has its roots 
in the disability rights movement.17  Mental health consumers have 
also embraced the concept as a means of preserving their rights to 
make decisions about medical treatment and their lives.18 
However, if supported decision-making is to take hold and 
supplant guardianship, attention must be paid to older persons and 
the particular ways that they might benefit from the shift.  The legal 
model cannot change unless it makes sense to, and offers 
improvements for, the majority of people subject to it.  Indeed, the 
aging of the population and the increase in Alzheimer’s disease and 
dementia threaten to place a greater amount of older persons at risk 
of guardianship.  The Alzheimer’s Association predicts that the 
                                                                                                                                         
 14. See generally Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable 
Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111 (2013) (arguing that little is 
known about how supported decision-making works in practice and proposing an 
empirical research agenda). 
 15. See, e.g., HUMAN SERVICES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SUPPORTED DECISION 
MAKING PILOT: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH, PILOT EVALUATION YEAR 1 REPORT 
(2015), http://supporteddecisions.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/SDM-Evaluation-
Report-Year-1_HSRI-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZCP8-MDTS]. 
 16. See ERICA F. WOOD, A.B.A., STATE LEVEL ADULT GUARDIANSHIP DATA: AN 
EXPLORATORY SURVEY 11–14 (2006), http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/Resources/
Publication/docs/GuardianshipData.pdf [https://perma.cc/P748-UB7A] (summarizing 
limited empirical data that is available on guardianship). 
 17. See GUARDIANSHIP SUMMIT, BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP: SUPPORTED DECISION- 
MAKING BY INDIVIDUALS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 1–2 (2011), 
http://nlrc.acl.gov/Legal_Issues/Guardianship/docs/kris_glen_paper_final_10-12.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V3QS-CDQE] (finding that the CRPD, which utilizes supported 
decision-making, was a consequence of “activism and participation by the disability 
rights movement”). 
 18. See TINA MINKOWITZ, WORLD NETWORK OF USERS AND SURVIVORS OF 
PSYCHIATRY, LEGAL CAPACITY AS RIGHT, PRINCIPLE AND PARADIGM: SUBMISSION 
TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN RESPONSE TO 
ITS CALL FOR PAPERS ON THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF 
ARTICLE 12 (2011), http://www.wnusp.net/documents/2012/WNUSP_Article12_
Submission.doc [https://perma.cc/RH45-76JV]. 
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annual number of new cases of Alzheimer’s and other dementias is 
expected to double by 2050.19  Supported decision-making and/or 
other alternatives must be attractive and viable options if, for them, 
guardianship is to be supplanted, or at least minimized in its use.  
Without that embrace by older adult advocates, the movement 
toward supported decision-making is likely to stall or leave out a large 
portion of the population potentially subject to guardianship.20 
This Article argues that the paradigm shift away from guardianship 
to a right to legal capacity can and should apply to older persons who 
would otherwise be at risk of guardianship.  But, in order for it to 
take root, the theoretical underpinnings of the right to legal capacity 
should be expanded to more fully encompass the experience of older 
persons who would otherwise be at risk of guardianship.  Proponents 
also need to grapple with legitimate hesitations and objections 
concerning potential for abuse, as well as practicability.  This Article 
attempts to fill in those gaps by offering a normative argument for 
supported decision-making rooted in the particular concerns of older 
adults facing the loss of their rights.  It then suggests a number of 
contexts in which a shift away from guardianship for older persons 
may be achieved most readily. 
Part I describes guardianship and its limitations, even after the 
most recent wave of reform, which emphasized some preservation of 
autonomy for those with impaired decision-making abilities.  Part II 
traces the emergence of the right to “legal capacity” and the 
development of supported decision-making as a replacement for 
guardianships in the intellectual disability community.  Part III 
compares the concerns of older adults at risk of guardianship to those 
of persons with intellectual disabilities and describes the ways in 
which their interests and concerns with regard to legal capacity 
overlap and diverge.  Part IV sketches out a normative justification 
for preserving the legal capacity of older adults.  Finally, Part V 
                                                                                                                                         
 19. ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 2015 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES 20 
(2015) http://www.alz.org/facts/downloads/facts_figures_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9QAG-NX9H]. 
 20. Advocates for the rights of older persons also have a separate, but related, 
interest in sorting out a position on questions of legal capacity in advance of further 
efforts to arrive at an international human rights treaty on the rights of older persons. 
See G.A. Res. 65/18, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/182, ¶ 28 (Dec. 21, 2010) (establishing 
working group to consider the feasibility of additional instruments to protect the 
human rights of older persons). See generally Israel Doron & Itai Apter, The Debate 
Around the Need for an International Convention on the Rights of Older Persons, 50 
GERONTOLOGIST 586, 587 (2010).  Legal capacity is not the primary focus of such 
efforts but could prove to be a stumbling block should there be incoherence around 
the principles that would apply. 
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discusses the practicability of moving toward a supported decision-
making model.  It identifies ways in which the availability of a 
supported decision-making model can offer tangible benefits and 
identifies areas where further thinking is needed. 
I.  ADULT GUARDIANSHIP AFTER RECENT REFORMS 
In order to understand what supported decision-making and the 
right to legal capacity21 can offer older persons, as well as the 
backdrop of what they might replace, it is first necessary to consider 
the current state of guardianship law and practice.  This part describes 
the basic process of guardianship, and then discusses the most recent 
round of reforms that began nearly thirty years ago in the wake of 
media accounts of widespread exploitation and abuse in guardianship.  
It then concludes that reforms have only been a limited success in that 
practice has not conformed to legal changes that were supposed to 
preserve autonomy for persons under guardianship. 
A. The Mechanism of Guardianship 
Adult guardianship is a state law process, often occurring in 
probate court.  It is the legal system’s response to an adult who is or 
becomes mentally “incapacitated” and is deemed unable to make 
legally binding decisions.22  Most definitions of incapacity require two 
findings: (1) the individual is at risk of harm because of an inability to 
provide for personal or financial needs; and (2) the individual lacks 
the cognitive ability to understand and appreciate decisions.23  The 
central premise of guardianship is that the law will protect the person 
by appointing a surrogate to protect her from either her bad decisions 
                                                                                                                                         
 21. Supported decision-making is one means by which an individual may avoid 
guardianship and avoid being stripped of her right to legal capacity.  However, it is 
important to recognize that legal capacity can be taken away from individuals 
through means other than guardianship and that the right to legal capacity is broader 
than a right to supported decision-making.  See generally CRPD General Comment, 
supra note 6, ¶ 7. 
 22. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2016).  
 23. For example, the Uniform Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act 
defines incapacity with respect to managing property as “an impairment in the ability 
to receive and evaluate information or make decisions, even with the use of 
appropriate technological assistance.” UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE 
PROCEEDINGS ACT § 401(2)(a) (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 1997).  New York’s Article 81 
guardianship statute defines an incapacitated person as one “likely to suffer harm 
because: 1. the person is unable to provide for personal needs and/or property 
management; and 2. the person cannot adequately understand and appreciate the 
nature and consequences of such inability.” N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(b) 
(McKinney 2016). 
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or her inability to make decisions.24  Guardianship removes the legal 
right of the incapacitated person to make decisions and vests that 
right with a surrogate.  The person under guardianship ceases to be “a 
legal actor” whose decisions receive legal recognition.25 
Guardianships have typically affected three main groups: (1) older 
adults with cognitive impairments, such as dementia and, to a lesser 
extent, those living with stroke-related conditions; (2) persons with 
intellectual disabilities; and (3) persons with psychosocial 
disabilities.26  In recent years, as more attention has been brought to 
traumatic brain injury, that too has been counted as an impairment 
giving rise to guardianship.27  Of course, an individual may fall into 
not just one but also two or three of these categories at the same time 
or over the course of a lifetime.  Under many guardianship regimes, 
particularly now that many states use a functional assessment 
approach to incapacity determinations, the individual’s particular 
diagnosis or condition is not supposed to be determinative; what is 
supposed to matter is the functional ability to make decisions.28 
The removal of decision-making power is a significant deprivation 
of individual rights.29  Once under guardianship, persons may lose the 
right to choose where they live,30 how they spend their money,31 with 
                                                                                                                                         
 24. See In re Guardianship of Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567, 571–73 (Iowa 1995) 
(describing history of guardianship as protective mechanism).  Various schemes talk 
of persons under guardianship as “protected persons.” See, e.g., UGPPA § 401 
(creating “protective proceedings” for individuals’ property).  The guardian, in turn, 
is deemed to provide “protection.” Id. § 318. 
 25. Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, 
Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 119 (2012). 
 26. See id. at 93 n.1.  The condition that shows up in the most guardianship filings 
is dementia. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. JENUWINE, THE STATE OF ADULT GUARDIANSHIP 
IN INDIANA: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 46, in INDIANA ADULT GUARDIANSHIP 
STATE TASK FORCE, WHO’S OVERSEEING THE OVERSEERS? A REPORT ON THE STATE 
OF ADULT GUARDIANSHIP IN INDIANA (2012), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/
files/ad-guard-2012-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JDS6-GR3F].  In the study of 
Indiana filings, dementia was mentioned in 25.8% of filings, compared to 22% for 
cognitive/intellectual impairment and 10.5% for severe mental illness. Id.  Stroke-
related conditions were described in 5.4% and a general category of “conditions 
associated with old age” comprised 1.4%. Id. 
 27. See JENUWINE, supra note 26, at 62. 
 28. See UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT prefatory 
note (characterizing 1997 revision to uniform guardianship law as requiring a 
functional analysis). 
 29. See In re Guardianship of Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567, 575 (Iowa 1995) 
(“Guardianship involves such a significant loss of liberty that we now hold that the 
ward is entitled to the full panoply of procedural due process rights comparable to 
those present in involuntary civil commitment proceedings.”). 
 30. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22(a)(9) (McKinney 2010). 
 31. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(a) (McKinney 2015). 
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whom they spend their time, and with whom they have 
relationships.32  They cannot enter contracts, authorize the disclosure 
of their medical records, or make health care decisions.33  Thus, 
commentators have said that the person under a guardianship is 
reduced to “the status of a child”34 with the loss of the basic civil 
rights that adults enjoy.  The late Congressman Claude Pepper 
famously put it another way: “[t]he typical ward has fewer rights than 
the typical convicted felon.”35  Others have described guardianship as 
a “civil death.”36 
Why does the law permit such an incursion?  On the theoretical 
level, the justification is parens patriae, the ancient power of the state 
to protect those who are thought not able to protect themselves.37  
Historically, the king and his representatives exercised this power to 
wrest control over property.38  The common law, and later “lunacy” 
statutes, continued this practice in the United States, and the law 
further evolved to embrace a general principle that the state has an 
obligation to protect those deemed unable to care for themselves.39 
Whereas the theoretical justification for guardianship is the state’s 
protective power, in practice guardianships over older adults typically 
are sought when a relative, friend, or health care institution believes 
one of two situations has arisen: (1) some legally binding decision 
needs to be made and the person is thought not able to make it; or (2) 
the person is making decisions thought to be irrational and/or harmful 
to themselves.  In the first circumstance, guardianships become 
necessary due to the barriers imposed by two other doctrines that 
involve cognitive tests: informed consent for medical decisions and 
contractual capacity, both of which demand that decision-makers be 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. Id. § 81.22(2); see also Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567 (challenging guardianship 
brought by man whose guardian limited his time with his girlfriend and forbade him 
from marrying her). 
 33. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.21, 81.22. 
 34. Hedin, 528 N.W.2d at 572 (quoting Sheryl Dicker, Guardianship: Overcoming 
the Last Hurdle to Civil Rights for the Mentally Disabled, U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 485, 485 (1981)). 
 35. Abuses in Guardianship of the Elderly and Infirm: A National Disgrace: 
Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Aging, 100th Cong. 8 (1987) (statement of 
Claude Pepper, Chairman of H. Select Comm. On Aging). 
 36. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road 
from Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 9 (2012). 
 37. See Margaret K. Krasik, The Lights of Science and Experience: Historical 
Perspectives on Legal Attitudes Toward the Role of Medical Expertise in 
Guardianship of the Elderly, 33 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 203 (1989). 
 38. Id. at 204. 
 39. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 164. 
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able to understand and appreciate the consequences of their decisions 
and be able to communicate a decision.40  The inability to pass the 
“understand and appreciate” threshold is what drives many older 
people into guardianships, because third parties demand a legally 
cognizable actor to make health care decisions, engage in banking 
transactions, enter a residential lease, or engage in other real estate 
and financial transactions.41  If the person has the resources and 
inclination to execute an advance directive, such as a power of 
attorney or health care proxy, before experiencing significant 
cognitive decline, the law typically looks to the agent in those 
documents to make decisions.42  However, in the absence of such 
documents, or in situations when the named agents cannot act or 
could abuse their powers, a need for guardianship may arise.43 
In the second circumstance, a family member, government social 
services agency, health care institution, or other concerned party 
believes that an individual is at risk of financial or physical harm 
because of impaired decision-making ability.  A concerned person or 
agency may petition the court to take away a person’s decision-
making rights to stop or remedy financial or other abuse.44  Or, one 
family member may believe that another family member is not caring 
                                                                                                                                         
 40. On informed consent, see In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222, 1241 (N.J. 1985) 
(patient must be able to understand information conveyed, evaluate options, and 
communicate a decision). On capacity to contract, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
CONTRACTS § 15(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing that contract is voidable “if by 
reason of mental illness or defect  . . .  he is unable to understand in a reasonable 
manner the nature and consequences of the transaction” or “he is unable to act in a 
reasonable manner  . . .  and the other party has reason to know of his condition”). 
See also Ortelere v. Teacher’s Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460, 464 (N.Y. 1969) 
(party must be able to make a rational judgment about the transaction).  It is also 
black-letter law that each party to a contract manifest her assent to the transaction. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
 41. See YOTAM TOLUB, THE ISRAEL HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER FOR PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES, ALTERNATIVES TO GUARDIANSHIP IN FINANCIAL AFFAIRS 14 (Noga 
Kadman & Maya Johnston eds., Debbie Cohen trans.), http://bizchut.org.il/en/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Alternative-to-Guardianship-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8ABP-8FTP]. 
 42. See, e.g., In re May Far C., 877 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); In re 
Matter of Isadora R., 773 N.Y.S.2d 96 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
 43. See, e.g., In re Nora McL.C., 764 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) 
(affirming appointment of independent guardian where niece had abused power of 
attorney). 
 44. See infra notes 150–51 (third parties can petition the court for guardianship); 
PowerPoint: Jean Callahan & Raquel Romanick, Brookdale Center for Healthy 
Aging, Understanding Guardianship in New York State, Slide 17 (Nov. 2015) 
(unpublished presentation) (on file with author) (financial abuse mentioned as 
reason for guardianship in 12% of petitions reviewed in a sample of New York state 
guardianship cases). 
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properly for the person, and use a guardianship as a form of an adult 
custody battle.45  Or, the person may live in objectionable, hoarding 
conditions that the petitioner seeks to remedy through a 
guardianship.46 
Should the guardianship function as intended—with the surrogate 
acting responsibly and in keeping with the individual’s wishes, it could 
be a useful tool for maximizing her welfare while promoting her 
preferences.  Indeed, the National Guardianship Association, the 
leading professional group in the field, promotes as one of its 
standards of practice that the guardian shall “identify and advocate 
for the person’s goals, needs and preferences.”47  However, as is 
described in Section I.B, many guardianships are not that ideal, 
efforts to improve the system have been only a partial success, and, 
even at their best, guardianship still deprives the person of basic 
human rights. 
B. Recent Reform Efforts 
Concern about abuse within the guardianship system prompted a 
major wave of reform, starting in the late 1980s.48  These reforms 
were spurred by a major Associated Press exposé that portrayed a 
lawless system, under which older adults were summarily stripped of 
their rights, and then frequently subjected to exploitation by 
guardians whose actions went unchecked by the courts.49  In the wake 
of the AP’s report, which termed the guardianship system a “national 
disgrace,” reformers succeeded in overhauling the guardianship 
statutes in eighteen states between the late-1980s and late-1990s.50 
Much of the impetus for guardianship reform came from the legal 
community, with the American Bar Association playing a critical 
                                                                                                                                         
 45. See In re Camoia, No. 100250/2012, 2015 WL 4877675 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
 46. See Callahan & Romanick, supra note 44, at Slide 17 (hoarding mentioned in 
three percent of guardianship petitions reviewed in sample). 
 47. NAT’L GUARDIANSHIP ASS’N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE 6 (4th ed. 2013), 
http://www.guardianship.org/documents/Standards_of_Practice.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BB3X-ZSYH]. 
 48. See Glen, supra note 25, at 108–10.   
 49. See id. 109; Fred Bayles & Scott McCartney, Guardians of the Elderly: An 
Ailing System Part II: Many Elderly Never Get Their Day in Court, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Sept. 20, 1987, 11:50 PM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1987/Guardians-of-
the-Elderly-An-Ailing-System-Part-II-Many-Elderly-Never-Get-Their-Day-In-
Court/id-8ea94c1c992fd97e7eea7fe72a924f73 [https://perma.cc/5YRP-7FQK]. 
 50. See A. Frank Johns, Ten Years After: Where is the Constitutional Crisis with 
Procedural Safeguards and Due Process in Guardianship Adjudication?, 7 ELDER 
L.J. 33, 79 & n.398 (1999) (summarizing changes in state guardianship laws). 
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role.51  These reformers were leery of guardianships,52 and sought to 
limit their role significantly, especially when guardianships were 
brought to further a third party’s interest, or when less restrictive 
alternatives would suffice.53  But for the most part, these reformers 
stopped short of calling for the abolition of guardianship.  Few 
challenged the fundamental premise of guardianships—that the 
solution to an adult’s impaired decision-making is to wrest away her 
legal right to make decisions and deposit it into the hands of a 
surrogate.54  Thus, the debates largely took place around how an 
improved guardianship process should work, what had to be proven 
to appoint a guardian, how the courts should monitor the activities of 
the surrogate, and how extensive the guardian’s powers should be.55 
Reformers succeeded in changing the standard for determining 
whether to appoint a guardian from a diagnostic-based, medical 
declaration of incompetency to a functional assessment of the 
person’s ability to make decisions.56  They also imported due process 
into guardianship proceedings and mandated that an individual’s 
rights could not be taken away without a hearing, often with a right to 
counsel.57  They further imposed reporting obligations on guardians 
                                                                                                                                         
 51. See Glen, supra note 25, at 108–09; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
GUARDIANSHIP: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL 
GUARDIANSHIP SYMPOSIUM AND POLICY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION iii 
(1989) http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2011/
2011_aging_gship_agda_refrm.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2ZW-6A8N] 
[hereinafter GUARDIANSHIP: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM]. 
 52. See Lawrence A. Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance and Use of Limited 
Guardianship, 31 STETSON L. REV. 735, 740 (2002) (describing attitude of suspicion 
and antagonism toward guardianship). 
 53. See GUARDIANSHIP: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM, supra note 51, at 3. 
 54. See Glen, supra note 25, at 119 (noting that the most recent guardianship 
reforms pushed for a mode of guardian decision-making in which the person’s 
preferences would be adhered to but still transfer the decision-making right to the 
guardian). 
 55. See generally id. at 108-19 (breaking these reforms of the last thirty years into 
two rounds: the first addressing procedural protections and the move toward a 
functional, as opposed to medical, assessment of incapacity, and the second 
addressing the advent of substitute decision-making—making decisions for the 
person based on what she would have decided as opposed to using the more 
paternalistic best interests rubric). 
 56. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(c) (McKinney 2016) (describing 
functional assessment in determining whether person is incapacitated); see also 
Phillip B. Tor & Bruce D. Sales, A Social Science Perspective on the Law of 
Guardianship: Directions for Improving the Process and Practice, 18 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 7 (1994). 
 57. See Tor & Sales, supra note 56, at 3. 
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so that courts could monitor how guardians performed after their 
appointments.58 
Reformers also embraced the concept of “least restrictive 
alternative,” which had emerged in constitutional litigation involving 
involuntary commitment of persons with mental illness.59  First, 
revised statutes sought to end “plenary” guardianship, which grants a 
guardian virtually unfettered decision-making authority over all 
aspects of a person’s life.60  Instead, reformed guardianship statutes 
require that courts tailor guardianship so that the guardian is given 
only those powers necessary to meet the person’s needs.61  The 
person under guardianship is supposed to retain decision-making 
powers over other aspects of their lives not specifically designated to 
the guardian’s control.62  These ambitious aims are reflected in the 
“findings and purpose” language of New York’s primary adult 
guardianship law, which reads more like a declaration of individual 
rights than the preface to a statutory scheme that authorizes surrogate 
decision-making: 
The legislature finds that it is desirable for and beneficial to persons 
with incapacities to make available to them the least restrictive form 
of intervention which assists them in meeting their needs but, at the 
same time, permits them to exercise the independence and self-
determination of which they are capable.  The legislature declares 
that it is the purpose of this act to promote the public welfare by 
establishing a guardianship system which is appropriate to satisfy 
either personal or property management needs of an incapacitated 
person in a manner tailored to the individual needs of that person, 
which takes in account the personal wishes, preferences and desires 
of the person, and which affords the person the greatest amount of 
independence and self-determination and participation in all the 
decisions affecting such person’s life.63 
The other way in which the least restrictive alternative concept was 
applied to guardianships involved codifying the notion that 
                                                                                                                                         
 58. Tor & Sales, supra note 56, at 30. 
 59. See Glen, supra note 25, at 108 & n.67; see also Michael L. Perlin, “Their 
Promises of Paradise”: Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the Constitutional “Least 
Restrictive Alternative” Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 999, 
1010–17 (2000). 
 60. See Frolik, supra note 52, at 735 n.4, 740–41. 
 61. See, e.g., Frolik, supra note 52, at 735 n.4. 
 62. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.29(a) (McKinney 2010) (stating that 
person under guardianship retains all powers and rights except those granted to the 
guardian). 
 63. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2016). 
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guardianships are a means of last resort.64  Even if a person is deemed 
“incapacitated,” courts are supposed to reject a guardianship when 
the person has in place sufficient alternatives, such as a power of 
attorney or other resources, to meet their needs.65 
In addition, as the statutory language above suggests, there was 
some effort to change the standard for decision-making by guardians 
from a historical “best interests” standard to one that took into 
account the wishes, preferences, and desires of the person—what has 
been termed “substituted judgment.”66  Kristin Booth Glen has 
described this as a separate, later phase of the most recent reform 
movement, “intended to maximize the incapacitated person’s dignity 
and autonomy.”67  In their study of decision-making standards for 
guardians, Linda Whitton and Lawrence Frolik found that eighteen 
jurisdictions have some resemblance of the “substituted judgment” 
language in their guardianship statutes, but that fourteen of those also 
have “best interests” language as well.68 
On paper, these reforms were significant.  In practice, however, 
they can be judged as a limited success.  As Lawrence Frolik has 
argued, despite the significant changes in guardianship law, the 
culture and practice remain largely unchanged.69  There is limited 
empirical data about guardianship in general, but the few in-depth 
studies of state court files demonstrate that these reforms have, in 
large part, not been implemented as intended.  First, even though 
statutes require consideration of less restrictive alternatives and 
demand a high threshold for a finding of incapacity, guardianship 
petitions are rarely denied and proceedings are often pro forma and 
procedurally flawed, with persons alleged to be incapacitated 
                                                                                                                                         
 64. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.02 (a)(2) (McKinney 2016) (stating 
that guardianships should only be appointed if necessary), 81.03(e) (McKinney 2004) 
(requiring courts to assess other “available resources” such as powers of attorney, 
health care proxies, and representative payees, when assessing whether a person 
needs a guardian). 
 65. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.02(a)(2), 81.03(e); see also In re May Far 
C., 61 A.D.3d 680, 668 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); In re Isadora R., 773 N.Y.S.2d 96 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2004). 
 66. See Glen, supra note 25, at 98-99. 
 67. Id. at 119. 
 68. Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-Making 
Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1491, 1499 (2012). 
 69. Lawrence A. Frolik, Guardianship Reform: When the Best Is the Enemy of 
the Good, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 348 (1998) (“But the rock of guardianship 
culture and practice still stands, and stands mainly unchanged.”). 
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frequently appearing without counsel in some states.70  It is also quite 
common for guardians to be appointed for an indefinite duration, as 
opposed to a limited time necessary to resolve whatever crisis 
prompted the guardianship.71 
Second, notwithstanding the statutory thumb on the scale toward 
limiting the powers granted to guardians (and thereby taken away 
from the individual), courts continue to grant broad plenary powers 
to guardians in the majority of cases.72  Courts favor wholesale grants 
of power to guardians because they fear the burden of hearing future 
applications from guardians every time a new need arises that might 
warrant an expansion of the guardian’s powers.73  Thus, plenary 
guardianships are overwhelmingly the norm.74  For example, a recent 
study reviewed all guardianship filings in 2008 in certain Indiana 
courts and found that limited guardianships were granted in less than 
one percent of the cases.75 
Third, while it appears that substituted judgment standards have 
had some effect, it remains unclear how much success they have had 
on making sure that a guardian effectuates the person’s wishes.  In a 
survey of guardians, Whitton and Frolik found that the presence of 
substituted judgment language in statutes correlated with more 
conversations by guardians with the individuals regarding their 
preferences in health care and other decisions.76  The survey also 
found that guardians continued to take into consideration what they 
believed to be in the individuals’ best interests when making decisions 
                                                                                                                                         
 70. Pamela B. Teaster et al., Wards of the State: A National Study of Public 
Guardianship, 37 STETSON L. REV. 193, 199 (2007) (summarizing a 1994 study 
showing most hearings are very brief, most respondents are not represented, and 
evidence presented is limited); JENUWINE, supra note 26, at 44 (stating that in 97.6% 
of cases reviewed in an Indiana study, persons alleged to be incapacitated were 
unrepresented by counsel); WOOD, supra note 16, at 12 (finding that 64% of 
guardianships were granted before an attorney was appointed and 92% were granted 
before a court investigator’s report). 
 71. See Callahan & Romanick, supra note 44, at Slide 7 (finding that of 1636 
guardianship petitions that had been fully adjudicated, 972 resulted in permanent 
guardianship). 
 72. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 245 n.51 (2010) (citing studies that found 
limited guardianships in 0% to 7% of cases and 13% of cases); see also Teaster et al., 
supra note 70, at 219, 234; Frolik, supra note 52, at 740–44 (explaining that courts 
prefer, and often invoke, plenary guardianship, despite the option for limited 
guardianship because of its advantages). 
 73. See Frolik, supra note 52, at 741–44. 
 74. See Teaster et al., supra note 70, at 219, 234. 
 75. See JENUWINE, supra note 26, at 49. 
 76. See Whitton & Frolik, supra note 68, at 1534. 
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on their behalf.77  There is scant case law in which persons under 
guardianship challenge guardian decision-making for not taking 
account of their wishes, likely because of how difficult it is for persons 
under guardianship to obtain legal assistance to challenge decisions 
by their guardians.78 
Fourth, studies have shown that guardianship monitoring in many 
states ranges from non-existent to deeply flawed and reports of 
guardianship abuse persist.79  In a report on a survey of judges and 
court personnel, the National Center for State Courts quoted a 
number of respondents as stating that their courts did not have the 
resources to adequately monitor guardianships.80  With regard to 
checking on the personal well-being of the person under 
guardianship, as opposed to checking on the accounting of finances, 
the Center concluded that “[f]ew courts regularly monitor the 
condition of the incapacitated person.”81  Such findings have also 
appeared on the state level.  For example, a recent study of 
guardianships in Pennsylvania reports that seventy-five percent of 
clerks in the courts that handle guardianships do not monitor whether 
the guardian submits the initial inventory—an accounting of assets 
that the person possesses at the beginning of a guardianship—and 
sixty-nine percent of clerks do not monitor whether the guardian 
submits annual reports.82  A 2010 Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report “identified hundreds of allegations of physical abuse, 
neglect and financial exploitation by guardians in 45 states and the 
                                                                                                                                         
 77. Whitton & Frolik, supra note 68, at 1534. 
 78. See Jenica Cassidy, Restoration of Rights in the Termination of Adult 
Guardianship, 23 ELDER L.J. 83, 102 (2015) (describing the difficulties persons under 
guardianship have in finding, retaining, and affording counsel, especially because 
they are no longer in control of their money, to pursue restoration of their rights). 
 79. See BRENDA K. UEKERT, CENTER FOR ELDERS AND THE COURTS, ADULT 
GUARDIANSHIP COURT DATA AND ISSUES: RESULTS FROM AN ONLINE SURVEY 5 
(2010), http://www.guardianship.org/reports/Guardianship_Survey_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DG8P-M75N]; GUARDIANSHIP MONITORING COMMITTEE, 
GUARDIANSHIP MONITORING COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 118 
(2014), http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/page-543/file-4022.pdf?cb=1444534377573 
[https://perma.cc/5748-B6WL]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1046, 
GUARDIANSHIPS: CASES OF FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION, NEGLECT, AND ABUSE OF 
SENIORS 27 (2010) [hereinafter GAO-10-1046]. 
 80. See UEKERT, supra note 79, at 24–25; see also Arian Campos-Flores & Ashby 
Jones, Abuses Plague System of Legal Guardians for Adults, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 
2015, 1:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/abuse-plagues-system-of-legal-guardians-
for-adults-1446225524 [https://perma.cc/U7RF-8YQD] (providing examples of abuse 
and the lack of oversight for guardians). 
 81. See UEKERT, supra note 79, at 5. 
 82. See GUARDIANSHIP MONITORING COMMITTEE, supra note 79, at 118, 138. 
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District of Columbia between 1990 and 2010.”83  A steady drumbeat 
of press reports from around the country has confirmed that these 
deficiencies persist and point to a lack of monitoring and enforcement 
by court systems.84 
To be sure, this account has focused on the shortcomings, not the 
cases in which guardians assisted a vulnerable individual by providing 
needed services and care.85  It has also not focused on describing the 
many substantial efforts afoot to improve matters and to make sure 
that the guardianship system functions as intended.86  Or the many 
times that court monitors have caught guardians who have attempted 
to cheat the persons whom they are supposed to be protecting.87  But, 
as a systemic matter, it is hard to conclude that the reformed 
guardianship regimes have delivered on their promises of enhanced 
autonomy and accountability. 
                                                                                                                                         
 83. GAO-10-1046, supra note 79.  To cite just one example, the GAO recounted a 
New York case in which the guardian misappropriated at least $327,000 to herself, 
family, and friends from an eighty-two-year-old retired judge—all while presiding 
over the decrease of his estate from several million dollars to almost nothing. Id. at 
13. 
 84. See, e.g., Campos-Flores Jones, supra note 80; Colton Lochhead, Clark 
County’s Private Guardians May Protect—or Just Steal and Abuse, LAS VEGAS 
REVIEW-JOURNAL (Apr. 13, 2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/
las-vegas/clark-county-s-private-guardians-may-protect-or-just-steal-and-abuse 
[https://perma.cc/Q9GK-LZNW]; Shannon Mullen, Investigation: Betrayal of Trust: 
Stealing from Seniors, ASBURY PARK PRESS (June 27, 2015), http://www.app.com/
story/news/investigations/watchdog/investigations/2015/06/27/guardianship-abuse-
incapacity-trial/71006830/ [https://perma.cc/H4XM-2ME2]; Lucas Sullivan, Jill 
Riepenhoff, Mike Wagner & Josh Jarman, Elderly, Mentally Ill & Children Trapped 
in Broken Court System, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (May 18, 2014, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/05/18/elderly-mentally-ill-and-
children-trapped-in-broken-court-system.html [https://perma.cc/7J7G-XQ5V]; Lise 
Olsen, Guardianship Putting Thousands of Elderly Texans at Risk, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE (Nov. 3, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/
article/Guardians-for-the-elderly-and-disabled-paid-2251312.php [https://perma.cc/
EZM4-CBNL]. 
 85. See Callahan & Romanick, supra note 44, at Slide 23 (noting that financial 
management was put in place in forty-three percent of case files reviewed and that 
services or care were arranged in forty-two percent of case files reviewed). 
 86. See, e.g., NATIONAL GUARDIANSHIP NETWORK, WINGS TIPS: STATE 
REPLICATION GUIDE FOR WORKING INTERDISCIPLINARY NETWORKS OF 
GUARDIANSHIP STAKEHOLDERS 3–5 (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2014_wings_implementation_guide.authch
eckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/C54X-SS26] (describing court-community partnerships 
promoted by the National Guardianship Network in a number of states to improve 
practices). 
 87. See, e.g., In re Gilvary, 938 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (censuring 
guardian for writing checks out of the guardian account without authority to do so). 
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II.  DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AND THE 
RIGHT TO “LEGAL CAPACITY” 
A growing chorus of critics argues that even under the best 
guardianship, the mere fact that the guardianship has adjudged an 
individual as incapacitated or incompetent, and stripped her of the 
right to act on her own behalf, causes significant harm.88  As Leslie 
Salzman argues, this deprivation of rights undermines an individual’s 
independence, diminishes her status in the eyes of others, stigmatizes 
her, and results in her constructive isolation from civil society.89  The 
question is whether the law can offer an alternative mechanism in 
these situations, one that does not strip the individual of her legal 
rights and rather recognizes her as a legal actor who makes decisions.  
This is the goal of the movement for the right to legal capacity. 
When states were reforming their guardianship laws, advocates for 
persons with intellectual disabilities were developing a wholly 
different model to address legal decision-making.  Kristin Booth Glen 
traces this “paradigm shift,” which re-conceptualized the right to 
decision-making for persons with cognitive impairments, to three 
contemporaneous phenomena: the rise of the disability rights 
movement, the development of integration mandates for children and 
adults with intellectual disabilities, and the rise of human rights 
norms, both in general and as tools used by the disability rights 
movement.90 
The concept of supported decision-making traces its roots to the 
early 1990s in Canada, where independent living advocates for 
persons with disabilities grappled with the obstacles that guardianship 
and other forms of surrogate decision-making imposed for persons 
seeking to live more autonomously.91  Supported decision-making 
“was seen to be a way to remove legal barriers created by issues of 
competency, which prevented people with intellectual disabilities” 
from making decisions about finances.92  Instead, advocates proposed 
                                                                                                                                         
 88. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 168–69; see also Glen, supra note 25, at 119 
(“[T]he person under guardianship is not, or is no longer, a legal actor.”) (alteration 
in original). 
 89. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 168–69. 
 90. Glen, supra note 25, at 123–38. 
 91. MICHAEL BACH & LANA KERZNER, LAW COMM’N OF ONTARIO, A NEW 
PARADIGM FOR PROTECTING AUTONOMY AND THE RIGHT TO LEGAL CAPACITY: 
ACHIEVING SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH 
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 33–34 (2010), http://www.lco-cdo.org/disabilities/bach-
kerzner.pdf [https://perma.cc/AA35-FPWU]. 
 92. Michelle Brownin et al., Supported Decision Making: Understanding How its 
Conceptual Link to Legal Capacity is Influencing the Development of Practice, 1 
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a system of support that would assist persons with disabilities in 
making decisions even if the person would have been considered to 
lack sufficient cognitive ability to make such a decision under 
traditional doctrines of informed consent and capacity to contract.93  
Advocates also proposed providing legal recognition to  relationships 
of trust in which supporters assist the person with a disability in 
making a decision through a number of means, such as explaining 
options in plain language, engaging in alternative forms of 
communication, and interpreting the individual’s preferences.94 
A. The Development of a Right to Legal Capacity 
The revolutionary approach of these proposals was to decouple the 
notion of “legal capacity”—the right “to make decisions and have 
those decisions respected”95—from cognitive decision-making ability, 
or what some have termed “mental capacity.”96  Legal capacity is a 
human right, “a social and legal status accorded independent of a 
person’s particular capabilities.”97  Whether an individual has the 
cognitive ability to understand and appreciate consequences of her 
decisions—the traditional threshold of the common law—is simply 
not determinative of whether she has legal capacity.  Even if she does 
not possess those decision-making abilities, she cannot be stripped of 
her legal capacity.98 
Article 12 of the CRPD, adopted in 2006, embraced this approach 
and mandates, as a human rights matter, that states “may not strip 
individuals of their legal capacity based on disability.”99  As a number 
of scholars have argued, Article 12 does not create any new rights to 
legal capacity, but merely restates the rights that already exist for all, 
                                                                                                                                         
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 34, 
35 (2014) (providing a useful and concise summary of the history of supported 
decision-making). 
 93. See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 72. 
 94. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 232–33. 
 95. BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 18. 
 96. “Mental capacity” is the phrase used in the first General Comment to the 
CRPD.  See CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 13. 
 97. See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 18. 
 98. A number of human rights theorists further break down legal capacity into 
two parts: “legal status,” which is the ability to hold rights that the state must 
recognize, and “legal agency,” which is the ability to have one’s decisions recognized 
by the law. Eilionóir Flynn & Anna Arstein-Kerslake, Legislating Personhood: 
Realising the Right to Support in Exercising Legal Capacity, 10 INT’L J.L. IN 
CONTEXT 81, 83 (2014). 
 99. CRPD General Comment, supra note 6. 
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and applies them in the context of persons with disabilities.100  Article 
12 also imposes an obligation on states to provide support to 
individuals with disabilities so that they may exercise their legal 
capacity.101  The individual, and not a surrogate, must hold the rights 
to make decisions.102  All measures related to legal capacity must 
“respect the rights, will and preferences of the person.”103 
When the CRPD was adopted, there was some debate about 
whether the convention permitted guardianship in certain 
circumstances with safeguards, or whether it barred guardianship 
completely.104  The U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities resolved this debate when it issued General Comment 
No. 1, which took the position that all forms of substitute decision-
making are forbidden under Article 12.105  “[S]ubstitute decision-
making regimes such as guardianship, conservatorship and mental 
                                                                                                                                         
 100. See Piers Gooding, Navigating the ‘Flashing Amber Lights’ of the Right to 
Legal Capacity in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: Responding to Major Concerns, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 45, 46–47 (2015). 
 101. See CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 3.  Leslie Salzman argues that 
support is also required under domestic law, specifically the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 157 (arguing that guardianship 
violates the integration mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act and that 
accommodations in the form of supported decision-making must be provided); see 
also Salzman, supra note 10, at 280. 
 102. See Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness - A Legal 
and Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 306 (2011) 
(individuals must hold the rights to make decisions in supported decision-making 
regimes as opposed to traditional guardianship models). 
 103. CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 22. 
 104. Amita Dhanda, Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: 
Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the Future?, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & 
COM. 429, 447–48, 455–56 (2007) (describing a variety of interpretations that nations 
ascribed to the text of Article 12). 
 105. CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 3 (“[T]he Committee observes that 
there is a general misunderstanding of the exact scope of the obligations of States 
parties under article 12 of the Convention.  Indeed, there has been a general failure 
to understand that the human rights-based model of disability implies a shift from the 
substitute decision-making paradigm to one that is based on supported decision-
making.”).  In the human rights parlance of Article 12, “substitute decision-making” 
refers to regimes that “permit the removal of legal capacity from certain individuals 
and vest it in third parties, who generally base decisions on the perceived objective 
best interests of the person.” Eilionóir Flynn & Anna Arstein-Kerslake, The Support 
Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, Fiction, or Fantasy?, 32 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 124, 125 
(2014).  In contrast, in the United States, “substituted judgment” has been used to 
refer to a particular type of decision-making that a surrogate engages in when she 
makes decisions based on what the person would have wanted. See Glen, supra note 
25, at 116.  Thus, in the human rights context of Article 12, “substitute decision-
making” refers more broadly to all forms of surrogate decision-making not done at 
the person’s direction. Id. 
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health laws that permit forced treatment . . . must be abolished in 
order to ensure that full legal capacity is restored to persons with 
disabilities on an equal basis with others,” the committee opined.106  
Substitute decision-making is impermissible even with regard to a 
single decision, the General Comment states.107 
In place of regimes such as guardianship, the General Comment 
called for states to instead provide support to assist persons with 
disabilities to exercise their legal capacity.108  Support, the General 
Comment states, is “a broad term that encompasses both informal 
and formal support arrangements, of varying types and intensity.”109  
The General Comment further requires that when a person’s will and 
preferences cannot be ascertained, a decision must be made using the 
“best interpretation of will and preferences,” and not “best interests,” 
as many substitute decision-making regimes require.110  What precise 
mechanism can be used to make this decision remains an open 
question.111 
It is worth pausing here to consider why the U.S. legal community 
should care about the CRPD, or an interpretation of it, when the 
United States has not even ratified the treaty.  Moreover, even if the 
treaty were ratified, its application to state guardianship laws would 
be somewhat attenuated.  President Obama signed the treaty with the 
United States’ standard “federalism” reservation, which limits 
enforcement of the treaty to matters of federal law; state and local 
law—of which guardianship is a creature—could not be governed by 
the treaty unless those laws violated federal law or the 
Constitution.112  Nonetheless, by signing the treaty, under established 
                                                                                                                                         
 106. See CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 7. 
 107. See id. ¶¶ 27, 28 (the CRPD requires the abolition of substitute decision-
making regimes). 
 108. See id. ¶ 28. 
 109. See id. ¶ 17. 
 110. See id. ¶ 21 (stating that the “best interpretation of will and preferences” 
standard “respects the rights, will and preferences of the individual”). 
 111. Bach & Kerzner have called this state “facilitated decision-making” in which a 
facilitator might be appointed by an administrative tribunal (should there be no 
advance directives in place naming a chosen decision-maker) but have not spelled out 
in precise detail the mechanics for its implementation. See BACH & KERZNER, supra 
note 91, at 91. 
 112. See LUISA BLANCHFIELD & CYNTHIA BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R42749, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES: ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 10 (2015).  Although 
guardianship is a creature of state law, the convention could nonetheless apply to it if 
guardianship were found to violate federal law.  My colleague Leslie Salzman has 
argued compellingly that state guardianship laws do violate federal law by running 
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international law principles, the United States is bound not to defeat 
its object and purpose.113 
Regardless of whether the treaty creates binding domestic legal 
obligations as a technical matter, it is having a significant impact on 
practice and on shaping the disability rights agenda.  Internationally, 
the convention has prompted a number of nations to reexamine their 
guardianship laws.114  In the United States, the convention has also 
been cited in several cases as persuasive authority on the rights of 
persons with disabilities to make their own decisions.115  And perhaps 
most importantly, it serves as a guidepost for law reform advocates 
and others pursuing the development of alternatives to guardianship 
domestically.116 
B. Support in Practice 
How do these concepts work in practice?  There is no one model 
for supported decision-making, and the term is often used to connote 
a wide variety of arrangements that assist persons in making decisions 
and avoiding guardianship.117  Some theorists distinguish between 
“support” and supported decision-making, with the former referring 
                                                                                                                                         
afoul of the integration mandate of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act. See 
generally Salzman, supra note 10, at 157. 
 113. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., COLUMBIA LAW SCH., BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS 
HOME: HOW STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CAN USE HUMAN RIGHTS TO 
ADVANCE LOCAL POLICY 3 & n.13 (2012), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/Bringing%20Human%20Rights%20
Home.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A7G-5BAB]. 
 114. For example, the Australian Law Reform Commission has issued a 
comprehensive report reviewing Australian laws for compliance with the right to 
legal capacity. See generally AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, EQUALITY, 
CAPACITY & DISABILITY IN COMMONWEALTH LAWS (2014), https://www.alrc.gov.au/
sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/alrc_124_summary_report_whole_pfd_.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4H58-HPCW].  For a compilation of the efforts that various 
countries have made to conform their laws to Article 12, see ARLENE S. KANTER, 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISABILITY RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM 
CHARITY TO HUMAN RIGHTS 269–77 (2015). 
 115. See In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 855 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 
2012); In re Mark C.H., 28 Misc. 3d 766, 786 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2010). 
 116. See generally Arlene S. Kanter, Guardianship for Young Adults with 
Disabilities as a Violation of the Purpose of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Improvement Act, 8 J. INT’L AGING L. & POL’Y, 1, 56–61 (2015). 
 117. Terry Carney and Fleur Beaupert have pointed out that supported decision-
making is a somewhat ill-defined term that has come to refer to a variety of 
arrangements, some of which entail long-existing informal assistance with decision-
making and some of which are done under the auspices of more recent legislation to 
create new types of legally recognized relationships. Terry Carney & Fleur Beaupert, 
Public and Private Bricolage—Challenges Balancing Law, Services & Civil Society in 
Advancing CRPD Supported Decision Making, 36 U. N.S.W. L.J. 175, 178 (2013). 
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to accommodations, such as accessible formats and technological 
assistance that enable an individual to process information and 
communicate a legally binding decision on her own.  The latter, in 
contrast, entails arrangements in which a supporter whom the 
individual trusts interprets her will and preference and communicates 
that to third parties, who then legally recognize the decision as valid 
on behalf of the individual.118 
As Jonathan Martinis and Peter Blanck point out, supported 
decision-making exists already in a multitude of forms; we all turn to 
supporters to assist us in making decisions—whether we ask advice, 
seek explanations, or designate someone to interface with an agency 
on our behalf.119  Arlene Kanter also notes that individuals with 
intellectual disabilities have long turned to supportive arrangements 
with others—from informal programs such as “circles of support” 
(groups of volunteers convened to support an individual in realizing 
their goals) to more formal mechanisms such as joint accounts, 
powers of attorney and health care proxies—to avoid guardianship 
and its attendant finding of incapacity.120 
Various legal regimes also have long acknowledged de facto 
supported decision-making, without naming it so.  For example, the 
ABA Rules of Professional Conduct contemplate that a lawyer 
should maintain “as far as reasonably possible” a normal lawyer-
client relationship with a person with diminished capacity and the 
comment suggests that the lawyer may have family members 
participate in the discussion in order to assist in the representation of 
the client.121  Federal courts permit “incompetent” individuals to 
appear by a guardian ad litem or “next friend,” who may bring the 
                                                                                                                                         
 118. See Gooding, supra note 100, at 58–59 (describing distinctions drawn by 
Canadian Association of Community Living).  Bach & Kerzner categorize three types 
of support: 
 “Supports to assist in formulating one’s purposes, to explore the range of choices 
and to make a decision; 
 Supports to engage in the decision-making process with other parties to make 
agreements that give effect to one’s decision, where one’s decisions requires this; 
and 
 Supports to act on the decisions that one has made, and to meet one’s 
obligations under any agreements made for that purpose.” 
BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 73. 
 119. Peter Blanck & Jonathan G. Martinis, ‘‘The Right to Make Choices’’: The 
National Resource Center for Supported Decision-Making, 3 INCLUSION 24, 26 
(2015), http://bbi.syr.edu/publications/2015/SDM_Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3B7K-THU3]. 
 120. See Kanter, supra note 116, at 52–53, 60–61. 
 121. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 & cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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suit on the other’s behalf without a formal proceeding or declaration 
of incompetency.122  Social Security, Medicaid, and other government 
programs implicitly recognize that a recipient may need support from 
family members or others in accessing benefits.123  For example, these 
programs have adopted mechanisms that permit assistance from 
others in the application and recertification processes.124  Even the 
HIPAA medical privacy regulations—which are widely assumed to 
restrict the involvement of anyone other than a patient in her care—
contemplate that there may be times in which a medical professional 
may need to communicate with a person involved in the patient’s care 
in order to facilitate that care.125 
The primary way in which supported decision-making has been 
implemented as a new formal concept has been through legislation 
recognizing supported decision-making agreements.  These 
agreements permit a person to designate a supporter even if the 
person would be found to lack the requisite cognitive capacity to 
enter into other types of contracts or a power of attorney.  The 
example often touted as a model internationally is the British 
Columbia Representation Agreement Act (BCRAA), enacted in 
1996.126  The Act permits an individual to enter an agreement to 
designate supporters (even if that individual lacks the mental capacity 
to contract) and requires third parties to recognize those 
agreements.127  The BCRAA presumes that all adults are capable of 
entering such agreements.128  However, the Act also contemplates 
that an adult may be deemed incapable of making an agreement 
based on several factors, including whether she is able to demonstrate 
                                                                                                                                         
 122. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(2). 
 123. For example, the Social Security Administration provides that a family 
member or other person responsible for the care of a claimant may sign an 
application for benefits and has long provided for the appointment of a 
representative payee when someone is unable to manage their benefits on their own. 
See Program Operations Manual System, Social Security Administration, POMS GN 
00204.003(B)(1)(c), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200204003 [https://perma.cc/
AL6X-DKJZ]; 20 C.F.R. § 416.601 (1995) (representative payee).  The Medicaid 
program similarly permits recipients to designate authorized representatives to apply 
for benefits and otherwise interact with the agency on behalf of the individual. 42 
C.F.R. § 435.923 (2013).  
 124. 42 C.F.R. § 435.923 (2013). 
 125. See 45 C.F.R § 164.510(b)(3) (2013) (permitting limited disclosure of 
protected health information to third party involved in patient’s care when patient is 
incapacitated or not present). 
 126. See Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 405 (Can.). 
 127. Id. § 8.  For a concise description of the Act, see Glen, supra note 25, at 145-
46. 
 128. See Glen, supra note 25, at 147. 
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choices and preferences and whether she has a relationship of trust 
with the supporter.129  Thus, the model does not completely supplant 
the possible need to resort to guardianship for those unable to meet 
these thresholds.  Additional legislative models that incorporate 
varying degrees of supported decision-making can also be found in 
several other Canadian provinces, as well as in Sweden and 
Germany.130 
More recently, Texas became the first state in the United States to 
pass a supported decision-making statute.  The Texas Supported 
Decision-Making Agreement Act’s statutory purpose is to recognize 
“a less restrictive alternative to guardianship for adults with 
disabilities who need assistance with decisions regarding daily living 
but who are not considered incapacitated persons for purposes of 
establishing a guardianship” under the state’s guardianship statute.131  
The new statute permits an adult with a disability to authorize a 
supporter who may assist the individual in making and 
communicating decisions, as well as in accessing information 
necessary for such decisions and providing assistance in 
understanding that information.132  Notably, the Texas law does not 
contain an explicit cognitive threshold for entering into a supported 
decision-making agreement; instead, it merely requires that the 
individual act “voluntarily,” in the absence of coercion or undue 
                                                                                                                                         
 129. The Act states that adults can be deemed incapable of making a supported 
decision-making agreement by looking at these factors: 
 Whether the adult communicates a desire to have a representative make, help 
make, or stop making decisions; 
 Whether the adult demonstrates choices and preferences and can express 
feelings of approval or disapproval of others; 
 Whether the adult is aware that making the representation agreement or 
changing or revoking any of the provisions means that the representative may 
make, or stop making, decisions or choices that affect the adult; and 
 Whether the adult has a relationship with the representative that is characterized 
by trust. 
Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 405, § 2(8) (Can.); see also Glen, 
supra note 25, at 147.  In this way, by retaining some level of functional analysis of 
decision-making ability, the Act does not go as far as the Article 12 General 
Comment, which calls for the abolition of all functional evaluations of decision-
making on the grounds that they are “discriminatorily applied to people with 
disabilities” and used to deny basic human rights based on a presumption that they 
can “assess the inner workings of the human mind.” See CRPD General Comment, 
supra note 6, ¶15. 
 130. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 235–37 (describing the Swedish model); Glen, 
supra note 25, at 140–53. 
 131. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.003 (West 2015). 
 132. Id. § 1357.051. 
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influence.133  The statute contemplates that a supporter would engage 
in: 
[A] process of supporting and accommodating an adult with a 
disability to enable the adult to make life decisions, including 
decisions related to where the adult wants to live, the services, 
supports, and medical care the adult wants to receive, whom the 
adult wants to live with, and where the adult wants to work, without 
impeding the self-determination of the adult.134 
The statutory form agreement permits an individual to authorize a 
supporter to assist with food, clothing, shelter, health, and finances 
and is clear that the supporter may not make decisions for the 
person.135  Rather, the supporter is authorized to obtain information, 
help the person understand it, and help the person communicate her 
decision.136  The statute also requires third parties who are presented 
a copy of the agreement to rely upon it and immunizes them from 
civil and criminal liability for acting in good faith in reliance on the 
agreement.137   
Texas’s law is new, having passed in 2015; the following year, 
Delaware also enacted a supported decision-making law.138  The 
implementation of the laws in these two states will be closely followed 
and it is likely that additional laws and policies will formalize the 
practice of supported decision-making in the United States.  In 2014, 
Virginia’s legislature passed a resolution requiring the state 
Department of Health and Human Resources to complete a study on 
supported decision-making.139  The federal Department of Health 
and Human Services has also endorsed the concept and funded the 
creation of a national resource center to train practitioners and 
research supported decision-making.140 
                                                                                                                                         
 133. See id.  The Texas Supported Decision Making Agreement Act does not 
define “voluntarily” other than to modify it by saying “without undue influence or 
coercion.” Id. 
 134. Id. § 1357.002. 
 135. Id. § 1357.056. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. § 1357.101. 
 138. 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 214 (West); Del. Code Ann. Tit. 16, Chapter 
94A (2016). 
 139. H.R.J. Res. 190 (Va. 2014) https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?141+
ful+HJ190ER+pdf [https://perma.cc/DGB7-BCUF]. 
 140. See Bishop & Walker, supra note 12. 
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III.  SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AND THE RIGHT TO LEGAL 
CAPACITY FOR OLDER ADULTS 
So far, supported decision-making has largely been talked about as 
an alternative to guardianship for persons with intellectual 
disabilities141 and to a slightly lesser extent, persons with psychosocial 
disabilities.142  Most of the supported decision-making pilot projects 
have identified persons with intellectual disabilities as their target 
groups.143 
But, to date, supported decision-making has not taken hold to 
quite the same degree—in both the theoretical discussions and in 
practice—as an alternative for older adults who may be vulnerable to 
guardianship.144  For example, while supported decision-making 
agreements have become popular within the intellectual disability 
community in Canada, they have not been embraced as readily by 
elder law practitioners or by the aging community.145  This does not 
mean that older adults have not practiced supported decision-making 
informally, as many do turn to family and friends for support in 
critical decisions.  But a recent report commissioned by the Ontario 
Law Commission on the experience of formal supported decision-
making agreements in five provinces suggests that older adults do not 
                                                                                                                                         
 141. See Dinerstein, supra note 36, at 3 (2012); Kohn et al, supra note 14, at 1133 
(“supported decision-making is often seen as particularly likely to benefit those with 
ID”).  But see TERRY CARNEY, GUARDIANSHIP, “SOCIAL” CITIZENSHIP AND 
THEORIZING SUBSTITUTE DECISION-MAKING LAW 1, 3, 22 (2012). 
 142. See generally Salzman, supra note 10. 
 143. See, e.g., Pilot Project, supra note 13; (describing pilot project for individuals 
with intellectual or developmental disabilities in Massachusetts); MARGARET 
WALLACE, OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE, EVALUATION OF THE SUPPORTED 
DECISION MAKING PROJECT 15 (2012), http://www.opa.sa.gov.au/files/
batch1376447055_final_supported_decision_making_evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A6BU-T23P] (describing pilot project for persons with disabilities). 
 144. But see Arlene S. Kanter, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and its Implications for the Rights of Elderly People Under 
International Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 527, 559–64 (2009) (discussing the advances 
that Article 12 offers for older adults). 
 145. See generally KRISTA JAMES & LAURA WATTS, CANADIAN CTR. FOR ELDER 
LAW, UNDERSTANDING THE LIVED EXPERIENCES OF SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING 
IN CANADA: A STUDY PAPER 18 (2014) (report commissioned by the Law 
Commission of Ontario assessing experiences with supported decision-making in five 
Canadian provinces). But see NIDUS PERSONAL PLANNING RESOURCE CTR. AND 
REGISTRY, A STUDY OF PERSONAL PLANNING IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: 
REPRESENTATION AGREEMENTS WITH STANDARD POWERS 2 (2010) 
http://www.nidus.ca/PDFs/Nidus_Research_RA7_InAction.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CW4A-GTDB]  [hereinafter Nidus] (finding that forty percent of representation 
agreements, which are a tool for supported decision making, entered into in a three 
and a half year period were by persons ages seventy to ninety-nine). 
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use them as frequently as might be expected.146  Part III describes the 
differences in circumstances that give rise to guardianship for older 
adults with cognitive impairments versus younger persons with 
intellectual disabilities, and reviews possible explanations for 
different levels of engagement with supported decision-making. 
There are several differences between the situations of older adults 
at risk of guardianship and younger adults with disabilities that may 
account for the different levels of interest in supported decision-
making so far.  Parents of persons with intellectual disabilities often 
commence guardianships over their young adult children because 
service providers suggest it as a routine step to take when the child 
turns eighteen.147  Standard advice given to parents is that they need 
guardianships in order to continue being involved in assisting their 
child in obtaining benefits and services.148  Thus, for young adults 
with intellectual disabilities and their families, supported decision-
making can provide a welcome alternative that permits persons with 
disabilities to build skills that can promote independence while 
developing experience with making decisions that can facilitate 
independent living.149 
For older adults, when guardianship is sought by a family member, 
it is often adult children who petition the court.150  Often, some 
precipitating event prompts the guardianship, such as a legal 
transaction that needs to be accomplished which may involve assets 
that the person accumulated over the course of a lifetime, such as a 
house or retirement plan.151  If the individual has executed advance 
directives such as a power of attorney for financial matters and health 
care proxy or medical power of attorney for health care decisions, 
guardianship will likely not be necessary, as third parties will 
recognize these instruments.152  The family member seeking 
                                                                                                                                         
 146. JAMES & WATTS, supra note 145, at 77–78. 
 147. See, e.g., Kanter supra note 116, at 3, 15, 46. 
 148. See, e.g., Kanter supra note 116, at 15. 
 149. See, e.g., Kanter supra note 116, at 59–61. 
 150. JENUWINE, supra note 26, at 43 (“Among those cases in which the prospective 
guardian was an adult child of the proposed ward, the majority (66%) were cases 
where the ward was over the age of 75.”). 
 151. See, e.g., In re E.J.F., 983 N.Y.S.2d 202 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (guardianship 
necessary, in part, because retirement plan refused to release benefits to individual 
due to his incapacity). 
 152. See, e.g., In re May Far C., 877 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (reversing 
appointment of guardian because allegedly incapacitated person had previously 
executed power of attorney which obviated the need for guardian).  The standard 
advice given to someone with early dementia is to execute these documents. See 
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guardianship may be more concerned about expediency and ensuring 
that there is a legally recognized way to manage the person’s affairs 
than with preserving or promoting decision-making.153 
Persons without family support who are impaired may find 
themselves facing guardianship petitions after some sort of medical or 
financial crisis.  Health care institutions seek guardianship to make 
health care decisions, effectuate discharge planning back to the 
community, transfer a person to a nursing home from a hospital, or to 
obtain payment.154  State social services agencies also petition for 
guardianship over older adults, often in situations in which the 
individual is deemed to be at risk and has no one to assist them.155 
This practice points to another difference between older adults and 
younger individuals who might enter a guardianship.  Older adults 
tend to be more isolated and may lack other sources of family or 
community support.  Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner, the architects 
of the British Columbia act and leading thinkers on supported 
decision-making, have attributed the lack of supported decision-
making in the aging community to these factors, reasoning that 
because older people tend to be more isolated, they have fewer 
people in their lives who could play the role of supporters.156 
                                                                                                                                         
Planning Ahead, ALZHEIMER’S ASSOCIATION, http://www.alz.org/care/alzheimers-
dementia-planning-ahead.asp [https://perma.cc/2CNP]. 
 153. NIDUS, supra note 145, at 78 (noting that advance directives are viewed as 
more efficient than supported decision-making agreements). 
 154. See Callahan & Romanick, supra note 44, at Slide 13 (showing hospitals as 
petitioners in nine percent of cases and nursing homes as petitioners in fifteen 
percent).  For an example of a guardianship petition in which a hospital sought to use 
the guardianship to transfer the person to a nursing home and to have the guardian 
make major medical decisions without the person’s consent, see In re St. Luke’s 
Hospital Center, 607 N.Y.S.2d 574 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1993), aff’d 640 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1996).  For descriptions of nursing home petitions for guardianships in 
order to settle billing disputes, see Nina Bernstein, To Collect Debts: Nursing Homes 
Are Seizing Control Over Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/nyregion/to-collect-debts-nursing-home-seizing-
control-over-patients.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8RFT-3WAV].  For a description 
of nursing home guardianship practice in order to obtain Medicaid benefits for the 
resident, see Nancy Levitin, Nursing Home Petitioners and Guardianship, N.Y. ST. B. 
ASS’N J., Sept. 2015, at 54. 
 155. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.06(a)(6) (McKinney 2004) (providing that 
county department of social services may petition); Teaster et al., supra note 70, at 
209 (noting that fifteen states permit public guardian programs to petition for 
guardianships); see also In re Ardelia R., 812 N.Y.S.2d 140 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) 
(example of an APS case in which older adult was found in her apartment without 
water, food, electricity or heat). 
 156. BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 37 (report commissioned by the Law 
Commission of Ontario). 
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These explanations only go so far, however, in explaining the 
difference.  There also has not been the same type of movement 
linking the right to legal capacity to a broader struggle for rights of 
self-determination and access to services and independent living for 
older adults with cognitive limitations.  Organized groups concerned 
with progressive age-related cognitive decline, for example, are 
understandably focused on the urgent need for research and 
treatment resources, as well as the considerable demands of 
caregiving.157  To the extent the aging community has focused on 
questions of legal decision-making, it has been much more in the area 
of state prevention of elder abuse.158  In the words of the Canadian 
Centre for Elder Law, they “have not yet generally embraced 
supported decision-making as a formalistic concept of autonomy or 
personhood . . . .”159 
The Canadian study also hypothesizes that older adults turn to 
advance directives such as powers of attorney because they are 
quicker and more efficient than supported decision-making 
agreements, which require work by the supporter to explain and assist 
in the decision-making process.160  But supported decision-making 
will always require more work than substitute decision-making, 
whether the person being supported is a younger adult with 
intellectual disability or an older adult with dementia.  The question is 
how much work and how many resources do supporters and society 
choose to put into the endeavor? 
                                                                                                                                         
 157. See Policy and Advocacy, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 
http://www.alz.org/research/funding/alzheimers_policy_and_advocacy.asp#voicing 
[https://perma.cc/D288-MKNG]. 
 158. See Benjamin Pomerance, Finding the Middle Ground on a Slippery Slope: 
Balancing Autonomy and Protection in Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse, 16 
MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 439, 447–48 (2015) (describing debates 
over the development of mandatory elder abuse reporting laws). 
 159. NIDUS, supra note 145, at 77. 
 160. Id. at 52.  Under a power of attorney, the principal empowers an agent to act 
on her behalf.  The agent is supposed to follow the principal’s instructions but if none 
exist the agent may act in the best interests of the principal. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. 
OBLIG. LAW § 5-1505(2)(a)(1) (McKinney 2009).  Thus, a power of attorney differs in 
certain critical ways from a supported decision-making agreement, under which the 
decision always remains in the hands of the individual and in which the will and 
preferences of the individual, and not her best interests, guide the decision-making.  
Like a supported decision-making agreement, a power of attorney can be revoked at 
any time by the principal and does not result in a loss of legal capacity. 
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IV.  TOWARDS A NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION OF SUPPORTED 
DECISION-MAKING FOR OLDER PERSONS 
This is where the theoretical underpinnings of supported decision-
making come into play.  As articulated so far, they have been 
primarily aimed at the experiences of persons with intellectual 
disabilities and have not spoken in the same way to the situations 
encountered by older adults with cognitive impairments.  The same 
principles, however, that animate the move away from guardianship 
have particular meaning for older adults, including those living with 
dementia.  Part IV explores the chief arguments for the right to legal 
capacity—autonomy and personhood—and applies them to older 
adults. 
Perhaps the most frequently invoked argument for a shift away 
from guardianship is the promotion of autonomy for persons with 
disabilities.  Proponents have posited supported decision-making as a 
means of liberation for persons with disabilities who have heretofore 
been excluded from participating in the basic interactions that 
constitute participation in society.161  Gerard Quinn, one of the 
foremost thinkers on legal capacity, has articulated the theoretical 
stakes as follows: 
[Legal capacity] provides the legal shell through which to advance 
personhood in the lifeworld.  Primarily, it enables persons to sculpt 
their own legal universe – a web of mutual rights and obligations 
voluntarily entered into with others.  So it allows for an expression 
of the will in the lifeworld.  That is the primary positive role of legal 
capacity.  Let me emphasise this.  Legal capacity opens up zones of 
personal freedom.  It facilitates uncoerced interactions.  It does so 
primarily through contract law. 162 
Built into this concept of promoting autonomy is another, related 
idea—that one builds decision-making skills, and, with support, can 
move into a more independent state, in which less support may be 
necessary.  For example, the CRPD General Comment states that 
governments “have an obligation to provide training for persons 
receiving support so that they can decide when less support is needed 
or when they no longer require support in the exercise of their legal 
capacity.”163  Similarly, Bach and Kerzner talk about using facilitated 
decision-making—at least temporarily until the person has developed 
                                                                                                                                         
 161. BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 75. 
 162. GERARD QUINN, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, PERSONHOOD & LEGAL CAPACITY 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PARADIGM SHIFT OF ARTICLE 12 CRPD 10 (2010) (Concept 
Paper for the Harvard Law School Project on Disability Conference, Cambridge). 
 163. CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 24. 
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relationships of trust so the supporter can interpret the individual’s 
will and preferences.164 
This notion of improving decision-making ability over time is 
designed to address the situation of persons with severe disabilities, 
who may have been isolated or institutionalized, and to guard against 
making assumptions about how much support an individual needs.  
However, it does not always resonate with the experience of many 
older persons, who have a lifetime of exercising legal capacity behind 
them and may need more support over time, not less.  Among the 
very old, cognitive decline caused by Alzheimer’s is, at the moment, 
progressive and irreversible.  This is not to say that age-related 
conditions inevitably result in cognitive decline.165  Other conditions, 
such as cognitive impairments caused by stroke, may be temporary 
and partially reversible.166  Certain dementias may also be temporary 
or may progress quite slowly.167  But older adults at risk of losing their 
capacity are generally in a different position than persons with 
intellectual disabilities.  The former have had decades of exercising 
legal capacity and may require support for the first time to ensure 
that they can continue to do so.  The latter have not yet exercised 
legal capacity and are developing the skills and experience that will 
facilitate their ability to do so. 
Just as legal capacity can serve as a means of liberation for younger 
persons with disabilities, so too can it preserve the autonomy of older 
adults.  Concerns for autonomy have long played a role in 
guardianship reform efforts, but efforts to increase the autonomy of 
persons under guardianship have simply not gotten very far in 
practice.  Statutes and standards call for balanced approaches that 
limit the powers of guardians and respect the wishes of the person.168  
But the evidence shows that as long as guardianship is the default, the 
impetus will be to strip the individual of broad powers and 
accommodate the needs of third parties.169  Thus, the default is one of 
paternalism and protection from oneself, not one of autonomy in 
which the individual is the legal actor.170  A paradigm shift toward 
legal capacity as a right can take this thumb off the scale. 
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By preserving autonomy and personhood for older persons, the 
right to legal capacity protects important interests in different ways 
than it does for younger persons.  Bioethicist Bruce Jennings has 
offered a compelling critique of the underlying paternalism of the 
guardianship system as it applies to preventing risky behavior by 
persons with dementia.171  He notes that the state finds its justification 
for curbing liberties in the promise that it is protecting an individual 
from harm so that she will be able to exercise more liberty later.172  In 
the early dementia context, he argues, this justification does not really 
apply: 
However worthwhile and valuable what comes in the future may 
be . . . it will not include greater freedom or autonomy.  When 
freedom is curtailed in early dementia it is final chances that are 
being forgone, not first chances with plenty of second chances yet to 
come.  These are the last times something will be attempted or done, 
and perhaps it is a recognition of this, however dimmed by disease, 
that makes the desire to do something so curiously linger, even 
intensify, after the physical or mental capacity to do it safely has 
begun to slip away.173 
In contrast, Jennings and others talk about a different model for 
decision-making that is centered on the person as a subject, rather 
than an object to be protected or an entity that must be subdued for 
the convenience of third parties.174  This approach finds its roots in 
the work of the late Tom Kitwood, a British Alzheimer’s specialist 
who developed a theory of person-centered care for dementia.175  
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“Patient-centered” is a term used to signal a focus on the particular 
preferences, values, and wishes of an individual in health care; life 
planning for persons with disabilities; and other contexts.176  The 
concept developed in the movement toward community integration 
for persons with disabilities and has come to connote a process in 
which an individual plans for her future by identifying goals and 
needed supports to reach those goals, with the assistance of others 
whom she chooses to involve.177  In this way, person-centered 
planning laid some of the groundwork for supported decision-making. 
In the Alzheimer’s context, person-centered care was a means of 
focusing on the persistence of the self even as the disease 
progresses178 and society perceives a “loss of the self.”179  Kitwood 
and others have urged against making assumptions that a diagnosis of 
dementia forecloses the ability to participate in person-centered 
care.180  A small body of research from Kitwood and psychologists 
such as Steven Sabat has focused on the persistence of “self” in the 
face of Alzheimer’s disease and cautioned against taking cognitive 
loss, measured in standard assessments, as indicative of the loss of 
other aspects of the self that are socially constructed.181  
The empirical literature on decision-making and independence for 
older adults also shows that retaining control over decisions of daily 
life is correlated with better physical and mental health outcomes.182  
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These benefits accrue not just when older adults act completely 
independently, but also when they are given the opportunity to ask 
for assistance from others.183  In that respect, the findings are 
consistent with the theory advanced by supported decision-making 
proponents that autonomy should be viewed not as wholly individual 
but rather that it is something exercised “relationally, 
interdependently, and intersubjectively with others.”184 
In searching for ways to recognize the persistence of self, we can 
find a way to effectuate one of the most ambitious aspects of the legal 
capacity project: restoring and recognizing the humanity we all share, 
regardless of the degree of impairment.  Recognizing personhood is, 
of course, central to the movement for legal capacity.  Gerard Quinn 
has stated that “legal capacity is the tool for advancing personhood in 
the lifeworld—primarily by allowing us to construct our own legal 
universes and secondarily to fend off others who think they know 
better.”185  By decoupling the ability to understand and appreciate 
from legal personhood, Quinn argues, we expand the notion of 
personhood to include those who have historically been excluded.186  
This is of no small value in the older adult context, as persons with 
Alzheimer’s and dementia are routinely dehumanized in institutional 
and other care settings through physical and chemical restraints and 
other, less severe, means.187  In this way, supported decision-making 
in the older adult context can play a role in preserving the individual’s 
personhood and assisting them in what Bruce Jennings has called 
“find[ing] new and different ways of being a self” for as long as it is 
possible.188 
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V.  BUT CAN IT WORK?  TESTING THE THEORETICAL AGAINST 
PRACTICE 
No one assumes that the shift away from guardianship will happen 
overnight.189  Advocates anticipate a lengthy process during which 
supported decision-making alternatives and infrastructure develop 
while governments begin to review guardianship and other laws to 
progressively implement reforms that respect the right to legal 
capacity.190  The main arguments against supported decision-making 
are not that it lacks normative justification, but rather that it is 
untested and likely cannot work in all situations, that it requires 
enormous resources, and/or that it will permit persons to make bad 
choices or to be taken advantage of.191  It is hard to know how and if 
supported decision-making could work in every case, which is why 
many have called for pilot projects and assessments.192  But granting 
that there are tremendous unknowns remaining, Part V sketches out a 
number of ways in which the availability of supported decision-
making statutes and services for older persons could lead to 
reductions in the use of guardianship and provide other benefits.  It 
then outlines two areas in which thinking needs to develop further. 
A. Tangible Benefits of the Right to Legal Capacity for Older 
Adults 
In this Section, I sketch three ways in which more widespread 
availability of support and supported decision-making can offer 
immediate benefits that enhance autonomy for older adults and 
reduce the use of guardianship.  First, the availability of supported 
decision-making alternatives and services has the potential to limit 
the already rickety enterprise of assessing mental capacity to restrict a 
person’s legal right to make decisions.  Assessments of capacity are 
fraught with subjectivity and there appears to be no clear, consistent 
way to measure mental capacity.  In a fascinating summary of the 
research on assessments of older adults’ capacity to consent to health 
care, Jennifer Moye and Daniel C. Marson find wild variations in the 
assessment of capacity.193  For example, when physicians conduct 
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assessments of capacity based on their perceptions of different patient 
cognitive skills, “agreement between physicians is near chance.”194  
When using established instruments for measuring capacity, 
agreement between physicians ranged from poor to good.195  They 
conclude that “[c]linical judgments of capacity can often be 
inaccurate, unreliable, and even invalid.”196  Thus, it seems as though 
the entire enterprise of assessing mental capacity, from which so 
many other legal consequences flow, is deeply flawed. 
Nonetheless, these assessments are not likely to disappear anytime 
soon.  But, by incorporating principles of support into at least the 
legal definitions of incapacity, it may be possible to reduce the 
frequency of incapacity findings.  So far, advocates have had greatest 
success with presenting supported decision-making as an alternative 
that can justify the termination of a guardianship.  One of the best-
known examples is the case of Jenny Hatch, a young adult with an 
intellectual disability who contested her parents’ petition for 
guardianship and her placement in a group home, where she was cut 
off from her friends and life in the community.  The judge granted the 
guardianship petition but appointed her friends as guardians instead 
of her parents and instructed the guardians to prepare for a transition 
to supported decision-making after a year.197  Such precedent—along 
with several other recent cases198—holds promise for older adults who 
may wish to get out from under guardianship, a notoriously difficult 
process.199  The same principles of looking to whether a person can 
make decisions with support should apply to deciding guardianship 
applications at the outset.  For most vulnerable older adults, the 
initial petition for guardianship is the important moment at which the 
availability of supported decision-making could prevent a declaration 
of incapacity. 
Second, to the extent that many older adults are pushed into 
guardianship due to various third parties or “gatekeepers” rejecting 
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their capacity to understand and appreciate financial and medical 
decisions, the broader availability of support and supported decision-
making can reduce this practice.200  Typically, a person must 
understand the relevant information, appreciate the consequences of 
a decision and be able to communicate that decision voluntarily in 
order for it to be legally binding.201  These elements underlie both the 
doctrine of informed consent202 and capacity to contract.203 
Frequently, family members of older adults turn to guardianship 
because someone at a benefit program, a health care provider, or a 
financial institution has decided that the older adult cannot 
understand and appreciate a decision or because the older adult has 
an impairment that prevents her from being able to obtain 
information and communicate consent directly.204  Thus, the concept 
of “capacity” becomes a barrier toward accessing needed benefits and 
services.  At this point, often the only recourse for a family member 
trying to support the person in obtaining benefits or accessing services 
or funds is to seek guardianship.205 
But legal recognition for the role of a supporter who can assist the 
older adult in obtaining information and making a decision could 
enable the person to make legally binding decisions, and thus obviate 
the need to resort to guardianship just to access services, benefits, or 
funds.  In addition, more explicit mandates for support would enable 
the person to make the decision directly, without another acting as 
her supporter.  Forms of support might include plain language 
explanations, accessible formats, and the like, as well as more 
extensive use of some of the basic techniques for enhancing a person’s 
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decision-making capabilities: taking extra time; engaging in multiple 
visits, especially during the morning if that is when the person is most 
alert; discussing one discrete issue at a time; repeating information, 
and providing cues that enhance recall.206  Research on the ability to 
provide informed consent confirms that such types of techniques, and 
particularly those that minimize memory demands and verbal 
retrieval—can support some individuals with dementia to the point 
they can provide informed consent when they would otherwise be 
deemed unable under standard screening instruments.207  These 
techniques are feasible and should be already required by anti-
discrimination laws, though application of those laws for these 
particular accommodations has been underdeveloped to date.208 
Third, on a practical level, the wider availability of supported 
decision-making could force the legal, health care, and social services 
systems to confront underlying failures without depriving persons of 
their decision-making rights.  As the expression goes, to a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail.  Guardianship is currently used as a 
means of fixing many problems, only some of which have to do with 
impairments in decision-making.209  For example, in New York City, 
where I practice, it is common for the social services agency to file for 
guardianship when a senior is on the verge of eviction.210  It is also 
used by hospitals when patients disagree with a discharge plan, 
particularly when the hospital wishes to discharge an individual to a 
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nursing home and the person wants to go home,211 or when other 
discharge planning obstacles arise.212  Guardianship is also used by 
nursing homes when no one is available to manage the person’s funds 
so that she can become Medicaid eligible or to settle payment 
disputes with relatives.213  To be sure, all of these situations present 
significant problems and challenges; however, there is no reason that 
these thorny problems should necessarily be resolved by stripping 
individuals of their legal capacity.  More rigorous protection of the 
right to legal capacity would ensure that guardianship is not resorted 
to as readily when problems concerning older adults arise. 
B. Outstanding Questions 
Many challenges lie ahead for advocates seeking to promote the 
right to legal capacity.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
respond to every objection or obstacle to supported decision-
making.214  However, this section will focus on two key questions that 
have particular significance for older adults and propose an agenda 
for further thinking on those points. 
First, how might the right to legal capacity apply in the really hard 
cases of advanced Alzheimer’s when there are no advance directives 
in place?  According to the General Comment to Article 12, any form 
of substitute decision-making, such as a guardianship—even imposed 
for one transaction—would violate the individual’s right to legal 
capacity.215  Instead, the General Comment proposes that “[w]here, 
after significant efforts have been made, it is not practicable to 
determine the will and preferences of an individual, the ‘best 
interpretation of will and preferences’ must replace the ‘best interests’ 
determinations.”216 
What mechanism should be used to discern a person’s will and 
preferences if that person cannot use a supported decision-making 
agreement?  The General Comment does not answer this question.  
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In Texas and British Columbia, guardianship is the only option for 
these individuals.217  However, Article 12 says guardianships are 
never allowed.218  Thus, Article 12 seems to rely on a legal fiction that 
persons will remain the legal actors making their own decisions under 
circumstances where it may not be possible to discern their will and 
preferences.  The fiction serves a purpose in that it ensures that those 
with the most severe impairments remain persons under the law.  But 
the contradiction and the mechanics of following Article 12’s 
requirements need further elaboration in the literature, as the 
pragmatic problems are so substantial that they risk undermining the 
rest of the project.219 
A tribunal or facilitator attempting to interpret the will and 
preferences of an older person suffering from progressive cognitive 
decline at least has the benefit of a lifetime of decisions and wishes to 
examine – something that may not be the case when discerning the 
will and preferences of younger persons with disabilities who have not 
been afforded many decision-making opportunities.  Nonetheless, the 
record does not answer all the questions and there has been a debate 
over how much prior wishes should matter as compared with wishes 
expressed after the onset of Alzheimer’s disease.220   Ronald Dworkin 
advocated for respecting the person’s earlier wishes, which he views 
as reflecting her values and judgments built over a lifetime.221  
Rebecca Dresser, in contrast, has emphasized adherence to the 
person’s current wishes because the person may not be who she used 
to be.222  Agnieszka Jaworska contrasts the two notions of autonomy 
at play in Dworkin’s and Dresser’s work and stakes out a third 
position that constructs autonomy as connected to values and 
convictions, which she contends do not require someone to 
necessarily recall their whole life story.223  For Jaworska, the capacity 
to value requires that “the person thinks she is correct in wanting 
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what she wants; achieving what she wants is tied up with her sense of 
self-worth; and the importance of achieving what she wants is, for her, 
independent of her own experience.”224  The neurological evidence, 
she contends, shows that this capacity to value usually remains in the 
brain long after the ability to remember and to reason may have been 
damaged by Alzheimer’s.225 
This recognition of values is a different formulation from the “will 
and preferences” that Article 12 seeks to protect but, ultimately, is 
not inconsistent with that idea and may have more resonance for 
older persons with serious cognitive impairment.  Jaworska roots 
autonomy “in the ability to lay down the principles that will govern 
one’s actions,” as opposed to the notion of will and preferences.226  
Still, there is a kinship between the two concepts in that personhood 
does not derive from the ability to effectuate either will and 
preferences or values.  As Jaworska notes, “means-ends reasoning 
and planning are mere tools for implementing the principles” that a 
person may have laid down for running their life.227  This formulation 
of autonomy provides an underlying principle that may be useful in 
guiding the development of mechanisms for determining will and 
preferences to effectuate the right to legal capacity. 
The second, and most significant challenge to supported decision-
making, is to ensure that it will not make older adults more 
vulnerable to abuse.228  Older adults, especially those with cognitive 
impairments are at significant risk of being abused, especially 
financially.  Studies show that “between 3% and 5% of the older adult 
population has experienced financial exploitation by a family member 
in the past year.”229  A person’s declining cognitive function, even 
among those who do not have dementia, appears to play a role in 
their susceptibility to scams.230 
The question is not whether there is elder abuse, as there is, or 
whether older adults suffering from cognitive impairments are more 
likely to be the targets of such abuse, as they are.  The question is 
whether a shift from a guardianship to supported decision-making 
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system would make individuals more vulnerable to abuse and limit 
the ways in which they can seek redress for their harms.  In thinking 
about what the paradigm shift may bring, it is important to recognize 
that guardianship itself can be the vehicle for elder abuse,231 as can 
powers of attorney.232  It is impossible to say that supported decision-
making will not be a vehicle, too. 
The specific concerns about abuse and undue influence are as 
follows.  First, how can older adults with cognitive impairments be 
protected from abuse and undue influence from those whom they 
have appointed as supporters?233  The Texas statute builds in 
protections by placing language on the supported decision-making 
agreement form that requires persons who see it, and believe that the 
individual is being abused, to report it to a state abuse hotline.234  The 
British Columbia statute requires the appointment of a monitor, with 
certain exceptions, in agreements authorizing the involvement of a 
supporter in financial decisions; the monitor can request accounts and 
other records and investigate whether the representative is complying 
with the individual’s wishes.235  In addition, the statute explicitly 
imposes some fiduciary duties on the supporter.236  More empirical 
work remains to be done on how effective these mechanisms are. 
In addition, if we move away from a guardianship system, are there 
other mechanisms that can substitute for the remedies by which a 
guardian can assist a cognitively impaired individual in un-doing 
abusive transactions?  How can we overcome the challenges to 
implementing them?  It is worth noting that elder abuse advocates 
have raised questions about the limits of guardianship as a tool to 
address elder abuse.  In a piece describing typical cases at an elder 
abuse shelter in the Bronx, New York, advocates note that abuse may 
produce cognitive and emotional decline, and result in “anguish, guilt, 
and shame—feelings that may present as a lack of decision-making 
ability.  These factors make it even more likely that, for victims of 
elder abuse, guardianship petitions may be filed inappropriately.”237 
                                                                                                                                         
 231. See GAO-10-1046, supra note 79 at 6-7. 
 232. See Kohn, supra note 182, at 3. 
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 234. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.056(a) (West 2015). 
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But it is undeniable that guardianship can be a useful tool for 
stopping abuse and voiding one-sided transactions, entered into 
directly by the person or by an agent abusing a power of attorney.238  
However, it is likely that guardianship has been used as a tool to do 
the work that other doctrines designed to protect persons from 
exploitation could do, but without depriving the victims of their right 
to legal capacity.  More thinking and empirical work needs to be done 
to identify the particular ways in which common law doctrines of 
undue influence, fraud, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and the 
like, along with consumer protection statutes, can be utilized in 
situations in which guardianships currently provide a ready and 
expedient remedy.239 
CONCLUSION 
The growing call for a shift from guardianship to supported 
decision-making reflects the convergence of two different reform 
efforts: one historically devoted to improving the process of 
guardianship and another emerging out of the disability rights and 
independent living movements.  Despite the historical disconnect 
between these groups, they are increasingly converging, and those 
concerned with the guardianship process have begun to embrace 
supported decision-making as a viable and worthwhile alternative.240  
Supported decision-making and the right to legal capacity have 
become topics at conferences on guardianships and aging, and have 
been endorsed by a range of entities concerned with the legal rights of 
older adults.241  Supported decision-making has significant promise as 
a legal arrangement and practice that can preserve and enhance the 
autonomy of older adults who would otherwise be at risk of 
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guardianship while preserving their personhood in the eyes of the law.  
In order to realize these significant benefits, more work remains to be 
done to articulate a model that rings true for the situation of older 
adults and addresses their particular pragmatic concerns.242 
                                                                                                                                         
 242. See generally Kohn et al., supra note 14 (arguing that little was known about 
how supported decision-making works in practice and proposing an empirical 
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